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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN MCFADDEN CIVIL ACTION
v.
BIOMEDICAL SYSTEMS CORP. NO. 13-4487
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Savage, J. January 9, 2014
In this discrimination and retaliation case brought under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq., plaintiff John McFadden 
sues his former employer, Biomedical Systems Corporation (“BSC”) for wrongful 
termination. McFadden claims that BSC discriminated against him because of his 
disability when it refused his request for leave to have back surgery and then retaliated 
against him for making that request. McFadden seeks compensatory and punitive 
damages.
Moving to dismiss McFadden’s claims of discrimination and failure to 
accommodate, BSC argues that McFadden has not sufficiently alleged that he is 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA. BSC does not seek to dismiss McFadden’s 
retaliation claim, but does seek dismissal of the claims for punitive and compensatory 
damages with respect to the ADA retaliation claim and punitive damages for the PHRA 
claim.
We must decide whether McFadden’s allegation that he is limited in his ability to 
walk, stand and sit for long periods of time is sufficient to state a cause of action under
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the ADA, and whether he has stated a claim that he was regarded as disabled by BSC 
and that he had a record of disability.
Accepting, as we must, McFadden’s well-pleaded facts as true and drawing all 
reasonable inferences from them in his favor, Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009), we conclude that he has stated causes of action under the 
ADA for discrimination, actual and regarded as disability and failure to accommodate. 
He has failed to state a claim based upon a record of disability. Therefore, we shall 
grant in part and deny in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Background
As recited in the amended complaint, McFadden suffers from herniated discs in 
his back, which cause him pain and limit his ability to walk, stand and sit for extended 
periods of time. Am. Compl. ^ 13. While these limitations only affect McFadden 
periodically, they are permanent. Id. ^ 14. Although McFadden’s condition did not 
prohibit him from doing his job as a director of business development, he "very 
infrequently” needed "a reasonable accommodation.” Id. ^ 16. During his three-month 
tenure with BSC, he apprised his supervisor, Judith Currier, of his health condition and 
limitations. Id. ^ 15.
While employed by BSC, McFadden’s health condition deteriorated. Id. ^ 17. As 
a result, he scheduled an appointment to see his doctor. Id. ^ 18. He informed Currier 
that he would be taking a day off to attend a doctor’s appointment. Id. Currier and 
other BSC management expressed displeasure when McFadden advised them that he 
could not attend a meeting with a colleague because he had to keep the doctor’s 
appointment as he was experiencing increasing pain in his back. Id. ^ 19.
2
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After his doctor’s appointment, McFadden informed Currier that his doctor 
recommended that he undergo a spinal fusion and/or microdiscectomy surgery to treat 
his back problems. Id. ^ 21. He requested a two-to-three week medical leave for the 
surgery. Id. ^ 21. Currier expressed concern about the duration of the leave. Id. 
^ 22. Approximately one week after attending his doctor’s appointment and shortly after 
requesting medical leave, McFadden was terminated from BSC. Id. ^ 23.
McFadden claims that BSC discriminated and retaliated against him by 
terminating his employment. He alleges that his termination was in violation of the ADA 
and PHRA because it was based on his actual health problems, his record of health 
problems and his request for an accommodation. Id. ^ 27. McFadden also claims that 
BSC failed to accommodate his disability in violation of the ADA and PHRA when it did 
not grant him leave to undergo surgery. Id. ^ 28.
Procedural History
McFadden filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on August 31, 2012.1 After receiving a right to sue 
letter on May 23, 2013, he timely filed a complaint on August 2, 2013. After BSC moved 
to dismiss the complaint, McFadden filed an amended complaint. BSC then moved to 
dismiss McFadden’s amended complaint in part.
Standard of Review
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and 
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 
F.3d 329, 334 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
1 See Def.’s Partial Mot. Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 3 (“Def.’s Mot. Dismiss”).
3
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(3d Cir. 2008)). A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), giving the 
defendant "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (alteration in original). A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action” is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
555 (citation omitted). The complaint must put forward "direct or inferential allegations 
respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable 
legal theory.” Id. at 562 (quoting Car Carrier, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 
1106 (7th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis in original); Butler v. BTC Foods Inc., No. 12-492, 2012 
WL 5315034, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2012).
ADA Discrimination2
To state a cause of action for discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must 
allege that he (1) is "disabled” within the meaning of the ADA; (2) is otherwise qualified 
to perform, with or without reasonable accommodations, the essential functions of his 
job; and (3) has suffered an adverse employment decision as a result of the 
discrimination. Gaul v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation 
omitted).
BSC does not dispute that McFadden was a qualified individual or that he 
experienced an adverse employment decision. It contends that McFadden has not 
sufficiently alleged that he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
2 Relying on the same facts forming the basis for his ADA claims, McFadden also alleges 
violations of the PHRA. The ADA and PHRA are coextensive. Therefore, our analysis of McFadden’s 
ADA claims applies equally to his PHRA cause of action. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 
1996); Slagle v. Cnty. of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 265 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006).
4
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Under the ADA, a person is disabled if he (1) has a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of 
the impairment; or, (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. Williams, 380 F.3d at 
762 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). When it passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
("ADAAA”), Congress clarified that the phrase "substantially limits” is not intended "to be 
a demanding standard.” 154 Cong. Rec. S8840-01 (2008), 2008 WL 4223414.
Actual Disability
McFadden avers that his herniated discs qualify as an actual disability under the 
ADA. At times, his back condition causes him pain and "limit[s] his ability to walk, stand 
and sit for long periods of time.”3 According to BSC, these allegations are insufficient to 
establish a disability because back conditions preventing people from walking, standing 
or sitting for long periods do not constitute a significant restriction on a major life 
activity.4
There is no dispute that walking, sitting and standing are major life activities. 
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (major life activities include walking, standing and sitting); 
Kiniropoulos v. Northampton Cnty. Child Welfare Serv., 917 F. Supp. 2d 377, 385 n.12 
(E.D. Pa. 2013) (same). McFadden has sufficiently pled that he is substantially limited
3 Am. Compl. 13.
4 BSC cites a number of cases to support this proposition: Williams v. Excel Foundry & Mach., 
Inc., 489 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 2007); Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Lafayette Inc., 242 F.3d 
610 (5th Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999); Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. 
Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 1998); Highley v. Rick’s Floor Covering, Inc., 400 Fed. App’x 244, 246 
(9th Cir. 2010); Koller v. Riley Riper Hollin & Colagreco, 850 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Pa. 2012); McDonald 
v. City of New York, 786 F. Supp. 2d 588, 608 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 4-5. These 
cases either do not bind us or are inapposite. In Taylor v. Pathmark, the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff 
who could walk and stand for fifty minutes without rest was not disabled because "his ability to walk and 
stand [was] not significantly less than that of the average person.” 177 F.3d at 186-87. The Taylor Court 
considered a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, it applied a heightened standard and 
relied on a full factual record. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (explaining that "it is axiomatic” that the 
standards for a motion to dismiss and for judgment as a matter of law are "vastly different”).
5
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in the major life activities of walking, sitting and standing. To what extent, if at all, 
McFadden’s impairment substantially limits his ability to walk, stand and sit is a question 
of fact that is not appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 
213 (at the motion to dismiss stage, district courts should focus on threshold inquiry of 
whether plaintiff has pleaded he is disabled).
The amended complaint alleges that McFadden’s herniated discs limit his ability 
to walk, stand and sit for "long periods of time.”5 Given the ADAAA’s liberalized 
standards, McFadden’s allegation that he has an impairment that is disabling is 
sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.6 See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (complaint 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss where it identified impairment and alleged that it 
was a disability); Fleck v. WILMAC Corp., No. 10-05562, 2011 WL 1899198, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. May 19, 2011) (plaintiff’s allegation that she could not stand for more than an hour 
or walk more than a half mile sufficient to withstand Rule 12(b)(6) requirements); Lit v. 
Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., No. 04-3413, 2004 WL 2403007, at* 3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 
2004) (plaintiff claiming that Parkinson’s disease substantially limited his ability to walk 
and stand was disabled within meaning of ADA); see also Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 
F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (complaint sufficiently alleged a disability to survive a 
motion to dismiss when plaintiff claimed that her impairment substantially limited her 56
5 Am. Compl. 13.
6 The ADAAA rejected the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the term "disability” as it was 
interpreted in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. 
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). Sutton held that mitigating measures should be considered when 
determining whether an individual is substantially limited under the ADA. 527 U.S. at 483. Toyota held 
that, to be substantially limited, an individual must have an impairment that severely restricts or prevents 
her from engaging in activities of central import to most people’s daily lives. 543 U.S. at 198.
6
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ability to sit for extended periods of time). Therefore, McFadden has stated a claim that 
he is actually disabled.
Regarded as Disabled
Under the ADA, a person is "regarded as” disabled if he (1) has a physical or 
mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by 
his employer as having such limitation; (2) has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward 
the impairment; or (3) has no such impairment but is treated by his employer as having 
a substantially limiting impairment. Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 187 
(3d Cir. 1999) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2); Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., 719 F. 
Supp. 2d 484, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
BSC claims that McFadden has merely alleged that it was aware of his 
impairment. It argues that knowledge alone does not demonstrate that it regarded 
McFadden as disabled. McFadden counters that his allegation that he was fired one 
week after attending a doctor’s appointment to address his back condition and shortly 
after requesting a two-to-three week medical leave is sufficient.
An employer’s cognizance of an employee’s impairment alone is insufficient to 
show that the employer regarded the employee as disabled. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 
F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 1996). A close temporal proximity between the dates an 
employer learns of an employee’s physical or mental impairment and the employee’s 
termination is sufficient to raise an inference of "regarded as” disability discrimination. 
See, e.g., Warshaw, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 496; Stewart v. Bally Total Fitness, No. 99­
3555, 2000 WL 1006936, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2000).
7
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McFadden not only claims that BSC was aware of his impairment, he also 
alleges that he was fired within less than a week of his request for medical leave. His 
allegations of a close temporal proximity between his request for leave and his 
termination support an inference that BSC regarded him as disabled once it became 
aware of his condition. See Kiniropoulos, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 387 (temporal proximity of 
plaintiff’s disclosure of impairment and termination four months later supported an 
inference that plaintiff was regarded as disabled); Stewart, 2000 WL 1006936, at *5 
(temporal proximity of employee’s demotion, suspension and ultimate dismissal 
suggested he was regarded as disabled). Thus, McFadden has stated a claim for 
"regarded as” disability.
Record of Disability
BSC argues that McFadden has not stated a claim of discrimination based on a 
record of disability because he has not alleged that BSC was presented with or relied on 
any physical records suggesting that he had a substantially limiting impairment. We 
agree. See Butler, 2012 WL 5315034, at *3; Rahsman v. Dewberry-Goodkind, Inc., No. 
05-1931,2007 WL 188571, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2007).
A person has a record of a disability if he has a history of, or has been 
misclassified as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major 
life activity. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 437 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k). A history of a disability or impairment is not enough. 
The employer must rely on the record of disability in taking the adverse action. 
Eshelman, 554 F.3d at 437 (citing Colwell v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 
645 (2d Cir. 1998)).
8
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In the amended complaint, McFadden alleges he made Currier aware of his 
impairment, he occasionally needed a reasonable accommodation due to his health 
condition and he asked Currier for a medical leave to undergo surgery on his back.7 He 
alleges nothing about a recorded history of his impairment.
McFadden attached two medical documents to his opposition to BSC’s motion to 
dismiss. He contends the documents will establish that he has a record of disability. 
However, he does not allege that BSC had possession or knew of the records. 
Consequently, one cannot infer that BSC relied on them. See Eschelman, 554 F.3d at 
437. Therefore, McFadden’s claim that he had a record of disability will be dismissed.
Failure to Accommodate
BSC seeks dismissal of McFadden’s failure to accommodate claim on the ground 
that McFadden did not adequately allege that he is disabled. As determined earlier, 
McFadden has sufficiently alleged a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
The term discriminate includes a failure to make reasonable accommodations for 
an otherwise qualified employee’s known physical limitations. Williams v. Philadelphia 
Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004); Fleck, 2011 WL 1899198, at 
*4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). A plaintiff states a claim for discrimination based 
on a failure to accommodate where he alleges that an employer refused to make 
reasonable accommodations to his known physical or mental limitations. Kiniropoulos, 
917 F. Supp. 2d at 387-88; Williams, 380 F.3d at 761. McFadden alleges that BSC did 
not provide him with a reasonable accommodation as required by the ADA because it
7 Am. Compl. 15-16, 21.
9
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did not allow him to take a medical leave to undergo surgery. Instead, BSC fired him 
within a week of his requesting leave.
A medical leave to undergo surgery is a reasonable accommodation. See 
Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 151 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(explaining that federal courts have recognized leaves of absence as reasonable 
accommodations); Bernhard v. Brown & Brown of Lehigh Valley, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 2d 
694, 701 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (stating that a medical leave can be a reasonable 
accommodation). McFadden has alleged that he requested a reasonable 
accommodation and that BSC denied his request. These allegations state a claim for 
failure to accommodate under the ADA.
Punitive Damages for PHRA Claims
BSC argues that McFadden’s claims for punitive damages should be dismissed. 
Specifically, it avers that punitive damages are not available under the PHRA.
McFadden concedes that punitive damages are not recoverable under the PHRA. 
Gagliardo v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 570 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (punitive 
damages are not available under PHRA); Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 
1998) (same); Weaver v. Cnty. of McKean, No. 11-254, 2012 WL 1564661, at *6 (W.D. 
Pa. Apr. 9, 2012) (accepting uncontested claim that punitive damages not allowed by 
PHRA and dismissing such claims). Accordingly, we will dismiss his claims for punitive 
damages on his PHRA claims.
Punitive Damages for ADA Failure to Accommodate and Discrimination
Claims
Punitive damages are recoverable under the ADA. See Kozempel v. Grand View 
Hosp., No. 10-6839, 2011 WL 1196851, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2011) (citing 42
10
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U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allows for punitive damages where 
an employee demonstrates that an employer has engaged in intentional discrimination 
"with malice or with reckless indifference to [the employee’s] federally protected rights.” 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). BSC argues that the amended complaint does not contain 
facts giving rise to a reasonable inference that it acted with malice or reckless 
indifference towards McFadden.
McFadden alleges that BSC was aware of his disability and health problems. 
Despite its awareness, BSC did not grant his request for leave to undergo surgery and 
instead fired him. These allegations, if proven, could lead a reasonable fact-finder to 
conclude that BSC acted with malice or reckless indifference.
Damages for ADA Retaliation Claim
BSC avers that McFadden is not entitled to punitive or compensatory damages 
on his ADA retaliation claim. We agree.8 As other courts in this circuit have found, 
punitive and compensatory damages are not available remedies where a plaintiff lodges 
an ADA retaliation claim. See Sabbrese v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 
311, 331 (W.D. Pa. 2004); Weaver, 2012 WL 1564661, at *7; Santana v. Lehigh Valley 
Hosp. and Health Network, No. 05-01496, 2005 WL 1941654, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 
2005). Therefore, McFadden’s claims for punitive and compensatory damages with 
respect to his retaliation claim will be dismissed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, BSC’s motion to dismiss will be granted in part and 
denied in part.
8 McFadden concedes that punitive damages are not available for ADA retaliations claims. Pl.’s. 
Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 17-18. He does not address BSC’s argument that compensatory 
damages are not available.
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